Tag: counter-UAS

  • Lockheed Martin Leads $50 Million Series B for Counter-Drone Firm Fortem Technologies

    Lockheed Martin Leads $50 Million Series B for Counter-Drone Firm Fortem Technologies

    Counter-drone technology developer Fortem Technologies has closed a $50 million Series B financing round led by Lockheed Martin, the Lindon, Utah-based company announced on September 30, 2026. Lockheed Martin had committed an initial $25 million to the round in April 2026 and completed the remaining $25 million as part of this close, with participation from Unusual Machines and other strategic and institutional investors.

    Funding to Expand SkyDome Production

    Fortem said the capital will accelerate manufacturing at its Utah facility and expand global deployment of its SkyDome family of counter-uncrewed aerial systems. The SkyDome portfolio combines TrueView radar sensors for detection and tracking, command-and-control software, and DroneHunter autonomous interceptors designed to classify and physically capture hostile drones in flight. Fortem’s technology has also been integrated with Lockheed Martin’s Sanctum counter-UAS architecture, giving the defense giant a direct stake in the smaller firm’s sensor-to-effector pipeline.

    Backed by Growing Government Demand

    The round follows a run of federal contract wins for Fortem, including a spot as a prime contractor on a Department of Homeland Security counter-UAS hardware and software IDIQ carrying an initial ceiling above $1 billion, a separate DHS order to protect 2026 FIFA World Cup venues, and an Army contract covering installation protection. Industry observers point to this contract activity as evidence of surging demand for layered counter-drone defenses across US critical infrastructure and major public events.

    Terms beyond the disclosed $50 million total and the $25 million Lockheed Martin tranche have not been detailed by either company. More counter-drone funding and procurement developments are tracked in the SectechMedia Technology News archive.

    Sources

  • Hegseth Orders Pentagon to Treat Counter-Drone Approval Delays as “Operational Risk”

    Hegseth Orders Pentagon to Treat Counter-Drone Approval Delays as “Operational Risk”

    Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth has signed a memorandum ordering the Pentagon to treat bureaucratic delays in fielding counter-drone technology as an operational risk, aiming to clear procedural bottlenecks that have slowed deployment of systems meant to protect U.S. military bases, critical infrastructure and other domestic assets from unmanned aircraft threats, DefenseScoop reported on October 2.

    The five-page directive, dated September 28 and titled “Project Agincourt: Pathway to the Autonomous Warfare Command,” was publicly released the following Friday. “The Department will take down barriers so our warfighters can take down drones,” Hegseth wrote in the memo.

    What the Directive Changes

    The memo targets specific administrative chokepoints that have historically slowed counter-drone hardware and software adoption, including radio spectrum and frequency authorization delays and lengthy safety review processes. Review and approval authorities are now required to treat any delay in processing counter-drone requests as an operational risk rather than routine paperwork.

    Hegseth directed the Pentagon’s chief information officer to review, within 30 days, how DoD components submit counter-UAS spectrum requests to interdepartmental spectrum authorities and to recommend ways to speed approval — work that will feed into the Defense Innovation Unit’s “Project Spectrum Strike” effort. Separately, the department’s chief digital and AI officer was told to coordinate with the CIO, the Office of General Counsel, the Defense Information Systems Agency, U.S. Cyber Command, and the military services to build a single, department-wide approval process that cuts authority-to-operate timelines for tested, validated counter-drone systems from months down to days or weeks.

    JIATF-401 as the Enforcement Backbone

    The directive functions as an enforcement mechanism for Joint Interagency Task Force 401, the Pentagon’s lead counter-drone coordination body, which Hegseth designated as the department’s “synchronization point” for counter-UAS employment across the military services, combatant commands and interagency partners. Under the memo, JIATF-401 becomes the repository for technical data, common hazard assessments, approved mitigation measures and threat intelligence used in all counter-UAS weapon safety reviews.

    Army Lt. Col. Adam Scher, a JIATF-401 spokesperson, told DefenseScoop that the task force “is taking aggressive action to streamline bureaucratic approvals and remove barriers that delay lawful, safe, and effective counter-drone operations,” adding that “JIATF-401 will not accept a slow-moving bureaucracy when faced with a fast-moving threat.”

    Why It Matters

    The directive arrives amid mounting drone incursions over U.S. installations and escalating cartel-linked drone activity along the southern border, pressures that have already driven JIATF-401’s Falcon Peak test series — including its most recent iteration at Yuma Proving Ground — and a pending move toward urban-environment counter-drone demonstrations. By explicitly reframing spectrum and authorization delays as risk rather than process, the memo signals that acquisition speed, not just new hardware, is now a formal Pentagon priority for close-in drone defense.

    • Memo: “Project Agincourt,” signed September 28, 2026, released October 2
    • Key fixes: Spectrum/frequency authorization review (30-day CIO review); single department-wide ATO process targeting days-to-weeks timelines
    • Lead body: Joint Interagency Task Force 401 (JIATF-401), designated as the department’s synchronization point

    Source: DefenseScoop, “Hegseth issues new directive to hasten U.S. military’s counter-drone pursuits,” October 2, 2026. Confidence: DIRECT.

    Sources and Further Reading

  • U.S. Army Awards Up to $7 Billion in Counter-Drone Contracts to 10 Companies Under Domestic Shield

    U.S. Army Awards Up to $7 Billion in Counter-Drone Contracts to 10 Companies Under Domestic Shield

    The U.S. Army has awarded 10 companies a combined contract ceiling of up to $7 billion for counter-drone technologies, Joint Interagency Task Force 401 (JIATF-401) announced September 29, expanding a multi-vendor acquisition strategy intended to field layered defenses against small unmanned aircraft systems (sUAS) across military installations and other priority facilities in the United States.

    The awards were made as multiple-award indefinite-delivery/indefinite-quantity (IDIQ) contracts supporting Domestic Shield, a Department of War initiative to improve counter-UAS (C-UAS) protection for risk-prioritized facilities and assets, according to the Army’s public affairs office. The contracts also feed JIATF-401’s broader C-UAS Marketplace, an online catalog that lets military and other government customers compare vendor performance data before procurement.

    Ten Vendors, a Range of Capabilities

    According to the Army, confirmed by Breaking Defense, the base contract ceilings awarded are: Allen Control Systems Inc. ($500M), Digital Force Technologies LLC ($500M), DroneShield LLC ($500M), Echodyne Corp. ($250M), Napatree Technology LLC ($500M), PVP Advanced EO Systems Inc. ($250M), RADA Technologies LLC ($500M), SmartShooter Inc. ($150M), SRC Inc. ($500M), and L3Harris WESCAM ($500M).

    The Army said the contracts cover the full detect-track-identify-defeat kill chain, spanning compact radar systems, long-range tracking cameras, electronic countermeasures, automated robotic weapon stations, and smart optical scopes that let individual soldiers engage drones with standard rifles. The service did not specify which technologies each vendor will supply under the vehicle, leaving that to be determined through individual task orders as requirements emerge.

    Avoiding Vendor Lock-In

    Brent G. Ingraham, assistant secretary of the Army for acquisition, logistics and technology, framed the multi-vendor structure as a deliberate rejection of single-source dependency. “This multi-vendor marketplace enforces strict open architecture standards, breaking proprietary vendor lock and ensuring new technologies can immediately integrate into our existing defense networks,” Ingraham said. “By driving continuous competition among both prime vendors and non-traditional commercial innovators, we are securing the best value for the American taxpayer and ensuring our warfighters remain ahead of our adversaries.”

    Brig. Gen. Matt Ross, director of JIATF-401, said the approach is designed for speed as much as choice. “JIATF-401 is continuously working with the military services to provide the counter-UAS capabilities needed to protect warfighters and installations,” Ross said. “Our approach allows us to identify the right capabilities for specific operational requirements and rapidly deliver those capabilities to the warfighter.”

    Part of a Bigger Build-Out

    The awards are the latest in a steady cadence of Domestic Shield contracting actions this year, following prior task orders to vendors including AeroVironment, which separately received a three-year, $500 million IDIQ to supply C-UAS capabilities under the same program. JIATF-401, established roughly 18 months ago, has said it has compiled a “global priorities list” of installations requiring upgraded drone defenses, running into the hundreds. The flow of IDIQ awards signals the Pentagon is moving counter-UAS procurement from pilot-scale testing toward enterprise-scale, multi-vendor fielding — a shift that domestic security integrators, airports, and critical-infrastructure operators watching the counter-drone market closely will likely see mirrored in adjacent civilian procurement in the coming budget cycle.

    Source: U.S. Army press release, September 29, 2026, corroborated by Breaking Defense. Confidence: DIRECT.

    Sources and Further Reading

  • Counter-UAS Sensor Handover and Coverage-Gap Testing

    Counter-UAS Sensor Handover and Coverage-Gap Testing

    A counter-UAS system may detect a target with one sensor but lose it before another sensor or operator receives usable context. Coverage testing should measure the complete chain from first detection through classification, tracking, alerting and authorized response.

    Build a three-dimensional coverage model

    Map terrain, buildings, vegetation, reflective surfaces and restricted test areas. Coverage should be described by altitude, range and direction rather than a flat radius. Radar shadowing, RF interference and camera line-of-sight limits rarely share the same geometry.

    Record each sensor’s intended role. Radar may provide initial detection, RF equipment may identify a control link, and cameras may support visual classification. The test should not assume that every technology will observe every target.

    Measure handover between sensors

    Use authorized test flights or approved simulation tools to cross sector and sensor boundaries. Record the time of first detection, track creation, correlation, camera cue, operator presentation and classification. Verify that identifiers remain associated with the same target during handover.

    Test crossing targets and multiple simultaneous tracks. A system may perform well with one cooperative aircraft but merge, swap or drop tracks when trajectories intersect.

    Expose practical coverage gaps

    Vary altitude, speed, direction and approach path within legal and safety constraints. Include routes near rooftops, utility structures and site edges. Repeat tests under different weather and lighting conditions where optical or acoustic sensors contribute.

    Document whether a gap is caused by geometry, detection threshold, network delay, time synchronization or operator workflow. The corrective action may be a sensor move, configuration change or revised response procedure rather than an additional sensor.

    Validate decision and evidence workflows

    Confirm that alerts show location uncertainty, sensor confidence and supporting evidence. Operators should distinguish detection from identification and should understand the legal limits on mitigation. Record acknowledgements, escalation and event export so exercises can be reviewed.

    Counter-UAS testing must follow aviation, spectrum and public-safety rules. It belongs within a controlled Counter-UAS & Airspace Security assurance program, with retesting after sensor relocation, software updates, construction or major changes to the surrounding radio environment.

    Maintain a repeatable test library

    Store approved routes, simulated targets, sensor settings and expected event sequences. Repeat a core subset after software, map, network or camera changes. This makes regression visible and prevents each acceptance test from becoming an unrelated demonstration.

    Review missed and delayed detections with engineering and operations teams. Record the cause, operational consequence and corrective action. Where live flights are not permitted, use vendor-supported injection or replay tools while clearly distinguishing simulated evidence from field performance.

    Measure operator workload during dense scenarios and confirm that priority rules remain understandable. Archive track data, screen recordings and timing logs under controlled access. A final report should distinguish detection coverage, classification confidence and legally authorized response capability.

    Reference sources

  • US Air Force Seeks Deployable Counter-UAS Package

    US Air Force Seeks Deployable Counter-UAS Package

    The U.S. Air Force is seeking a deployable counter-UAS package intended to address gaps in the protection of operating locations. A federal opportunity notice identified by Unmanned Airspace points to demand for a capability that can be moved, established and integrated without relying on a permanent site architecture.

    What deployability changes

    A transportable system must balance coverage with logistics. Sensors, command equipment, power, communications and any authorized effectors have to fit the deployment concept and become operational within a useful period. Equipment that performs well at a fixed test range may behave differently when terrain, electromagnetic conditions and local air traffic are unfamiliar.

    The requirement also highlights the importance of interoperability. Counter-UAS packages need to exchange tracks and alerts with base-defense teams while preserving evidence for later review. Identification and escalation procedures must account for friendly drones, contractors and civilian activity near the protected area.

    Evaluation priorities

    Field testing should examine false alerts, setup repeatability, track continuity and operator workload, not merely maximum detection range. Sustainment, software updates and training can determine whether a deployable system remains useful after the initial exercise. The solicitation adds another procurement signal in the expanding counter-UAS market.

    Sources

  • Denmark Buys Weibel Radars for Military Counter-Drone Operations

    Denmark Buys Weibel Radars for Military Counter-Drone Operations

    Denmark’s defense acquisition organization is purchasing radars from Danish manufacturer Weibel Scientific for military counter-uncrewed-aircraft operations. The procurement reflects the growing emphasis on dedicated detection as armed forces respond to small and fast-moving aerial threats.

    Detection before engagement

    Unmanned Airspace reported the purchase on 21 September, citing Denmark’s defense procurement authority. Radar is one part of a counter-UAS chain that may also include radio-frequency sensing, electro-optical confirmation, command-and-control software and an authorized mitigation method. The sensors must provide tracks that operators can classify and correlate before any response is selected.

    Small aircraft create difficult conditions because terrain, buildings, birds and legitimate aviation can generate clutter or competing tracks. Performance therefore depends on siting, calibration and integration as much as on the sensor specification. Military deployments also need clear procedures for transferring tracks among local units and wider air-defense networks.

    Integration is the central test

    The acquisition should be judged by field acceptance, data quality and operational fit rather than radar count alone. Track continuity, false-alert handling and identification workflows are particularly important near bases and civilian airspace. Denmark’s purchase adds to European investment in counter-UAS and airspace security amid concern about both hostile drones and ambiguous incursions.

    Sources

  • Northrop Grumman Advances 50mm Proximity-Fuzed Round for Raid Hunter Air Defense

    Northrop Grumman Advances 50mm Proximity-Fuzed Round for Raid Hunter Air Defense

    Northrop Grumman says it has completed an aeroballistic test of a new 50mm projectile for Raid Hunter, the company’s gun-based air-defense system. The test used an XM913 Chain Gun and generated flight data intended to support development of a guided, proximity-fuzed round.

    The company said the rounds produced high-fidelity data for nearly every shot and broadly matched pre-test predictions. Raid Hunter is being positioned as a short-range option for engaging mixed raids that can include low-cost uncrewed aircraft. Northrop Grumman has not published enough test data for independent assessment of accuracy, engagement envelope or cost effectiveness.

    Proximity fuzing is intended to improve the probability of effect without requiring a direct projectile impact. In a counter-UAS role, however, overall performance also depends on sensor quality, target classification, fire-control integration and the safety constraints surrounding the defended area. Follow-on testing will need to demonstrate the complete engagement chain.

    Why it matters

    Gun-based systems are attracting attention as operators look for repeatable defenses against larger drone salvos. The test is a development milestone, not proof of field performance, and should be assessed as one element in a layered airspace-security architecture.

    Sources

  • JIATF-401 Awards More Than $25 Million for Southern Command Counter-UAS Capabilities

    JIATF-401 Awards More Than $25 Million for Southern Command Counter-UAS Capabilities

    The U.S. Department of Defense has awarded more than $25 million in multiple procurements to expand counter-uncrewed aircraft capabilities supporting U.S. Southern Command. The package includes interceptors and electronic-warfare systems intended to provide layered detection, tracking and defeat options against small drones.

    The awards were made through Joint Interagency Task Force 401. The task force said its accelerated acquisition process moved the selected capabilities from an operational requirement to fielding in less than a month. Officials described the work as an effort to improve air-domain awareness and precision defeat options across Southern Command’s area of responsibility.

    The announcement did not provide a complete public list of vendors, quantities or performance specifications. That limits direct technical comparison, but the combination of electronic-warfare and interceptor procurements indicates an emphasis on layered response rather than reliance on a single defeat mechanism. Sustainment, spectrum coordination and operator certification will also influence operational value.

    Why it matters

    Rapid acquisition can shorten the gap between a changing drone threat and deployed defenses. It also increases the importance of integration testing, rules of engagement, operator training and evidence-based evaluation across the full counter-UAS chain.

    Sources

  • Indra Unveils DRIZZLE Interceptor and Mother-Drone Concept for Mass C-UAS Defense

    Indra Unveils DRIZZLE Interceptor and Mother-Drone Concept for Mass C-UAS Defense

    Indra has introduced DRIZZLE, a family of autonomous effectors intended to counter mass drone attacks. The Spanish technology group presented the system at the UNVEX unmanned-systems event and described it as a compact, disposable interceptor that can operate as a hard-kill effector within a wider counter-UAS architecture.

    According to Indra and reporting by Unmanned Airspace, the interceptor is designed to exceed 400 kilometers per hour and has an approximate standalone range of 80 kilometers. The company also showed a mother-drone concept that carries several interceptors before releasing them closer to a threat area, extending the combined mission range to about 130 kilometers. These figures are vendor claims and have not been independently operationally validated.

    Indra said the interceptor uses a company-developed search and detection system to distinguish and lock onto threats. The proposed architecture allows multiple carrier aircraft and disposable effectors to be used against larger raids, while also permitting installation as a self-protection option for selected vehicles or helicopters.

    Why it matters

    The design illustrates a shift from single-target counter-drone tools toward layered systems intended for coordinated raids. Procurement teams will still need evidence on identification performance, command-and-control integration, safety constraints and cost per engagement before comparing it with other counter-UAS technologies.

    Sources

  • L3Harris to Ruggedize VAMPIRE Counter-Drone System for US Navy Littoral Forces

    L3Harris to Ruggedize VAMPIRE Counter-Drone System for US Navy Littoral Forces

    L3Harris Technologies announced on September 8, 2026 that it has been selected to deliver a maritime-ruggedized configuration of its VAMPIRE counter-drone weapon system to the US Navy, aimed at defending littoral combat forces against small unmanned aircraft and uncrewed surface vessel (USV) threats.

    What Is VAMPIRE

    VAMPIRE — Vehicle-Agnostic Modular Palletized ISR Rocket Equipment — is a self-contained, palletized weapon system originally designed to mount on standard vehicle cargo beds, pairing sensors with laser-guided munitions such as Advanced Precision Kill Weapon System (APKWS) rockets to engage small drones and other aerial threats. For the Navy configuration, L3Harris said it is adapting the system to withstand the environmental stresses of maritime and littoral operating conditions.

    “VAMPIRE is a flexible and effective system that meets the unique requirements of the U.S. Navy for littoral C-UxS defense,” said Tony Calderon, President of Targeting & Sensor Systems at L3Harris.

    Capabilities and Integration

    The system is designed to integrate with L3Harris’s Wraith Shield software for layered counter-unmanned-systems (C-UxS) defense, combining detection, tracking and engagement functions across a broader defense architecture. L3Harris has not disclosed a contract value or specific delivery timeline for the Navy variant.

    Why It Matters

    The Navy’s interest in a ruggedized VAMPIRE follows a broader push across the US military to field mobile, vehicle- and vessel-mounted counter-drone systems rather than relying solely on fixed-site defenses, as cheap commercial and militarized small drones proliferate among state and non-state actors. It also follows related moves by L3Harris to mount counter-drone sensors on an uncrewed ground vehicle alongside ARX Robotics, part of a wider industry trend toward distributing counter-UAS sensors and effectors across multiple platform types rather than concentrating them at fixed perimeters.