We’re Tracking the Future of Security

Category: Counter-UAS & Airspace Security

Detection and mitigation technologies for unauthorized drones and other low-altitude airspace threats — a fast-growing area of security technology.

  • DHS Puts Commercial Counter-Drone Systems Through Operational Testing With First Responders

    DHS Puts Commercial Counter-Drone Systems Through Operational Testing With First Responders

    The U.S. Department of Homeland Security’s Science and Technology Directorate said its National Urban Security Technology Laboratory (NUSTL) recently put commercially available counter-UAS systems through a week-long operational assessment with first responders, according to DHS statements reported by DRONELIFE and HSToday on October 1 and October 2, 2026.

    Operational Testing Over Lab Conditions

    NUSTL brought state and local law enforcement and other first responders to a federal test facility to evaluate counter-drone mitigation equipment against multiple drone types under conditions intended to resemble real deployments rather than controlled laboratory settings. NUSTL Director Alice Hong said the lab is “leading this C-UAS assessment, specifically looking at the mitigation aspects of these products,” adding that if first responders are going to deploy a technology, the lab tests it under operational conditions to confirm it is suitable for their use.

    Tied to Upcoming Grant Funding

    The exercise is meant to give agencies hands-on exposure to fielded systems before committing to purchases, as jurisdictions prepare for an anticipated second round of federal counter-UAS grant funding tied to SAFER SKIES Act provisions in the fiscal year 2026 National Defense Authorization Act, which expanded counter-UAS legal authorities to qualified state, local, tribal, and territorial agencies.

    DHS has not publicly named the vendors or specific systems evaluated, and no scoring or pass/fail results from the assessment have been released. The agency has run comparable test events previously, including work tied to World Cup host-city security planning earlier in 2026. More counter-drone developments are tracked in the SectechMedia Technology News archive.

    Sources

  • BAE Systems Completes Live Trials of BATS Integrated Counter-Drone System in Scotland

    BAE Systems Completes Live Trials of BATS Integrated Counter-Drone System in Scotland

    BAE Systems has completed a two-week series of live trials in Scotland of its Anti Threat System (BATS), an integrated counter-drone capability that links detection, operator decision-making and engagement through a single command-and-control architecture, the company reported.

    Three Test Scenarios

    The trials exercised BATS across three operational scenarios. The first assessed whether data from multiple sensors could be fused into a common operational picture, letting operators detect, identify and track airborne objects while distinguishing drones from non-threatening activity. The second scenario tested integration of electronic warfare and software-defined radio technology, with operators applying non-kinetic countermeasures to confirmed targets in near-real time. A third scenario ran a full detection-to-engagement sequence in a more complex tactical setting, including an integrated gun system, with operators confirming drone categories and selecting an appropriate effector for each threat.

    Open, Scalable Architecture

    BATS is built by BAE Systems’ Digital Intelligence business as a software-driven, open-architecture system intended to let customers plug in existing and future sensors and effectors rather than relying solely on expensive missile-based interceptors. The Scottish trials follow earlier integration and deployment testing completed in July 2026, which took the system from concept to field trial in about eight months. Human operators retained decision authority throughout the exercises, with BAE Systems stating the tests demonstrated the full “sense, decide, effect” mission chain against uncrewed aerial threats.

    BAE Systems has not disclosed a customer, contract value or procurement timeline tied to the trials. More counter-UAS developments are tracked in the SectechMedia Technology News archive.

    Sources

  • Lockheed Martin Leads $50 Million Series B for Counter-Drone Firm Fortem Technologies

    Lockheed Martin Leads $50 Million Series B for Counter-Drone Firm Fortem Technologies

    Counter-drone technology developer Fortem Technologies has closed a $50 million Series B financing round led by Lockheed Martin, the Lindon, Utah-based company announced on September 30, 2026. Lockheed Martin had committed an initial $25 million to the round in April 2026 and completed the remaining $25 million as part of this close, with participation from Unusual Machines and other strategic and institutional investors.

    Funding to Expand SkyDome Production

    Fortem said the capital will accelerate manufacturing at its Utah facility and expand global deployment of its SkyDome family of counter-uncrewed aerial systems. The SkyDome portfolio combines TrueView radar sensors for detection and tracking, command-and-control software, and DroneHunter autonomous interceptors designed to classify and physically capture hostile drones in flight. Fortem’s technology has also been integrated with Lockheed Martin’s Sanctum counter-UAS architecture, giving the defense giant a direct stake in the smaller firm’s sensor-to-effector pipeline.

    Backed by Growing Government Demand

    The round follows a run of federal contract wins for Fortem, including a spot as a prime contractor on a Department of Homeland Security counter-UAS hardware and software IDIQ carrying an initial ceiling above $1 billion, a separate DHS order to protect 2026 FIFA World Cup venues, and an Army contract covering installation protection. Industry observers point to this contract activity as evidence of surging demand for layered counter-drone defenses across US critical infrastructure and major public events.

    Terms beyond the disclosed $50 million total and the $25 million Lockheed Martin tranche have not been detailed by either company. More counter-drone funding and procurement developments are tracked in the SectechMedia Technology News archive.

    Sources

  • Counter-UAS Sensor Handover and Coverage-Gap Testing

    Counter-UAS Sensor Handover and Coverage-Gap Testing

    A counter-UAS system may detect a target with one sensor but lose it before another sensor or operator receives usable context. Coverage testing should measure the complete chain from first detection through classification, tracking, alerting and authorized response.

    Build a three-dimensional coverage model

    Map terrain, buildings, vegetation, reflective surfaces and restricted test areas. Coverage should be described by altitude, range and direction rather than a flat radius. Radar shadowing, RF interference and camera line-of-sight limits rarely share the same geometry.

    Record each sensor’s intended role. Radar may provide initial detection, RF equipment may identify a control link, and cameras may support visual classification. The test should not assume that every technology will observe every target.

    Measure handover between sensors

    Use authorized test flights or approved simulation tools to cross sector and sensor boundaries. Record the time of first detection, track creation, correlation, camera cue, operator presentation and classification. Verify that identifiers remain associated with the same target during handover.

    Test crossing targets and multiple simultaneous tracks. A system may perform well with one cooperative aircraft but merge, swap or drop tracks when trajectories intersect.

    Expose practical coverage gaps

    Vary altitude, speed, direction and approach path within legal and safety constraints. Include routes near rooftops, utility structures and site edges. Repeat tests under different weather and lighting conditions where optical or acoustic sensors contribute.

    Document whether a gap is caused by geometry, detection threshold, network delay, time synchronization or operator workflow. The corrective action may be a sensor move, configuration change or revised response procedure rather than an additional sensor.

    Validate decision and evidence workflows

    Confirm that alerts show location uncertainty, sensor confidence and supporting evidence. Operators should distinguish detection from identification and should understand the legal limits on mitigation. Record acknowledgements, escalation and event export so exercises can be reviewed.

    Counter-UAS testing must follow aviation, spectrum and public-safety rules. It belongs within a controlled Counter-UAS & Airspace Security assurance program, with retesting after sensor relocation, software updates, construction or major changes to the surrounding radio environment.

    Maintain a repeatable test library

    Store approved routes, simulated targets, sensor settings and expected event sequences. Repeat a core subset after software, map, network or camera changes. This makes regression visible and prevents each acceptance test from becoming an unrelated demonstration.

    Review missed and delayed detections with engineering and operations teams. Record the cause, operational consequence and corrective action. Where live flights are not permitted, use vendor-supported injection or replay tools while clearly distinguishing simulated evidence from field performance.

    Measure operator workload during dense scenarios and confirm that priority rules remain understandable. Archive track data, screen recordings and timing logs under controlled access. A final report should distinguish detection coverage, classification confidence and legally authorized response capability.

    Reference sources

  • Unauthorized Drones Interrupt Aerial Firefighting at California’s Timber Fire

    Unauthorized Drones Interrupt Aerial Firefighting at California’s Timber Fire

    Unauthorized drones have disrupted aerial firefighting around California’s Timber Fire, forcing pilots to suspend or redirect operations while unidentified aircraft were inside restricted airspace. The incident was highlighted in September 22 coverage after local authorities had issued temporary flight restrictions for the Timber and Plaskett fires in Monterey County.

    Why a small drone can halt an air operation

    Firefighting aircraft often work at low altitude, in smoke and close to terrain. A drone that is difficult to see can create a collision hazard for helicopters and fixed-wing tankers, so incident commanders may ground aircraft even when no impact has occurred. The result can remove reconnaissance, water-drop and retardant-drop capacity during a fast-changing emergency.

    Temporary flight restrictions are therefore an operational safety control, not merely an administrative boundary. Public messaging, geofencing information, remote identification and rapid reporting can help reduce accidental incursions, while counter-UAS decisions still have to comply with aviation and communications law.

    Security and resilience lesson

    The Timber Fire disruption illustrates the link between counter-UAS and airspace security and emergency-response continuity. Agencies need clear detection, identification and escalation procedures so that drone reports can be assessed quickly without creating additional risk to responders or the public.

    Sources

  • Perimeter Radar Commissioning: Clutter Maps, Zones and Target Validation

    Perimeter Radar Commissioning: Clutter Maps, Zones and Target Validation

    Perimeter radar commissioning is the process of turning a correctly installed sensor into a verified detection capability. The work includes mapping the real environment, defining alarm zones, testing representative targets and proving the handoff to cameras and operators. Default settings cannot account for every fence, slope, road or moving object around a site.

    Build a site-specific clutter picture

    Radar returns may come from vegetation, water, vehicles outside the boundary, rotating equipment, animals and other environmental movement. The commissioning team should observe the site over representative periods rather than tune the system during one quiet hour. Weather and seasonal conditions can change the background significantly.

    Clutter suppression must be used carefully. A filter that removes nuisance tracks can also reduce sensitivity to a real intruder moving near the same object. Record why an exclusion or threshold was introduced and retest the affected route with a representative target.

    Define zones around decisions

    Detection zones should correspond with security actions. An outer awareness zone may cue a camera, while a protected inner zone may create a high-priority alarm. Boundaries need enough separation to avoid rapid state changes when a target moves near an edge. Roads and public paths should be handled explicitly rather than left to repeated operator dismissal.

    Height, direction, speed and track-duration rules can improve classification, but each additional rule creates another way to miss unusual behavior. The design should remain understandable to operators and maintainers.

    Use representative target tests

    Testing should cover walking, running, crawling where relevant, groups, vehicles and movement across and toward the radar. Routes should include fence lines, terrain depressions and the edges of coverage. Record the path, target, time, weather, result and track continuity. Maximum-range claims are less useful than repeatable performance in the site’s critical zones.

    For counter-UAS applications, use authorized and safely managed targets appropriate to the requirement. Small aerial targets present different signatures and legal constraints from ground intrusion.

    Verify integration and operator workload

    An alarm should reach the command platform with the correct zone, priority and timestamp. If radar cues a PTZ camera, verify that the view is useful and that calibration remains accurate at multiple points. Operators should be able to distinguish a new alarm from an existing track and understand why the system classified it.

    Measure operator workload during a realistic observation period. A technically valid detection rate can still be operationally poor if recurring nuisance tracks overwhelm the team or if camera cueing repeatedly points to unusable views.

    Commissioning closes with an agreed acceptance record, baseline configuration and maintenance plan. Changes to vegetation, construction or neighboring traffic should trigger review. Radar becomes dependable perimeter security only when site-specific validation links detection to a clear response.

    Shift changes should be included because procedures and experience vary among operators.

    Reference sources

  • US Air Force Seeks Deployable Counter-UAS Package

    US Air Force Seeks Deployable Counter-UAS Package

    The U.S. Air Force is seeking a deployable counter-UAS package intended to address gaps in the protection of operating locations. A federal opportunity notice identified by Unmanned Airspace points to demand for a capability that can be moved, established and integrated without relying on a permanent site architecture.

    What deployability changes

    A transportable system must balance coverage with logistics. Sensors, command equipment, power, communications and any authorized effectors have to fit the deployment concept and become operational within a useful period. Equipment that performs well at a fixed test range may behave differently when terrain, electromagnetic conditions and local air traffic are unfamiliar.

    The requirement also highlights the importance of interoperability. Counter-UAS packages need to exchange tracks and alerts with base-defense teams while preserving evidence for later review. Identification and escalation procedures must account for friendly drones, contractors and civilian activity near the protected area.

    Evaluation priorities

    Field testing should examine false alerts, setup repeatability, track continuity and operator workload, not merely maximum detection range. Sustainment, software updates and training can determine whether a deployable system remains useful after the initial exercise. The solicitation adds another procurement signal in the expanding counter-UAS market.

    Sources

  • EASA Proposes New Security Rules for Drone Operations

    EASA Proposes New Security Rules for Drone Operations

    The European Union Aviation Safety Agency has issued Opinion 06/2026 proposing amendments intended to tighten the security of drone operations across Europe. The package addresses the continued growth of unmanned aviation and the need to align operational authorization with security, identification and oversight.

    From aviation safety to security assurance

    Unmanned Airspace reports that the opinion covers a broad set of changes affecting operators and authorities. EASA opinions are proposals within the European rulemaking process, not the same as rules already in force. Operators should therefore distinguish the published proposal from the legal text that may eventually be adopted.

    Security controls for drone operations can include operator identity, remote identification, protected command links, incident reporting and restrictions around sensitive locations. The practical effect depends on aircraft category, operating environment and the final implementing rules. Authorities also need systems that can consume identification data without treating every unknown aircraft as hostile.

    Implications for airspace security

    Airports, critical infrastructure operators and counter-UAS teams should follow the rulemaking because regulatory identification and operational data can improve incident assessment. They do not replace independent detection or response authority. A balanced airspace-security program must combine legal process, reliable sensor evidence and proportionate intervention.

    Sources

  • Denmark Buys Weibel Radars for Military Counter-Drone Operations

    Denmark Buys Weibel Radars for Military Counter-Drone Operations

    Denmark’s defense acquisition organization is purchasing radars from Danish manufacturer Weibel Scientific for military counter-uncrewed-aircraft operations. The procurement reflects the growing emphasis on dedicated detection as armed forces respond to small and fast-moving aerial threats.

    Detection before engagement

    Unmanned Airspace reported the purchase on 21 September, citing Denmark’s defense procurement authority. Radar is one part of a counter-UAS chain that may also include radio-frequency sensing, electro-optical confirmation, command-and-control software and an authorized mitigation method. The sensors must provide tracks that operators can classify and correlate before any response is selected.

    Small aircraft create difficult conditions because terrain, buildings, birds and legitimate aviation can generate clutter or competing tracks. Performance therefore depends on siting, calibration and integration as much as on the sensor specification. Military deployments also need clear procedures for transferring tracks among local units and wider air-defense networks.

    Integration is the central test

    The acquisition should be judged by field acceptance, data quality and operational fit rather than radar count alone. Track continuity, false-alert handling and identification workflows are particularly important near bases and civilian airspace. Denmark’s purchase adds to European investment in counter-UAS and airspace security amid concern about both hostile drones and ambiguous incursions.

    Sources

  • Northrop Grumman Advances 50mm Proximity-Fuzed Round for Raid Hunter Air Defense

    Northrop Grumman Advances 50mm Proximity-Fuzed Round for Raid Hunter Air Defense

    Northrop Grumman says it has completed an aeroballistic test of a new 50mm projectile for Raid Hunter, the company’s gun-based air-defense system. The test used an XM913 Chain Gun and generated flight data intended to support development of a guided, proximity-fuzed round.

    The company said the rounds produced high-fidelity data for nearly every shot and broadly matched pre-test predictions. Raid Hunter is being positioned as a short-range option for engaging mixed raids that can include low-cost uncrewed aircraft. Northrop Grumman has not published enough test data for independent assessment of accuracy, engagement envelope or cost effectiveness.

    Proximity fuzing is intended to improve the probability of effect without requiring a direct projectile impact. In a counter-UAS role, however, overall performance also depends on sensor quality, target classification, fire-control integration and the safety constraints surrounding the defended area. Follow-on testing will need to demonstrate the complete engagement chain.

    Why it matters

    Gun-based systems are attracting attention as operators look for repeatable defenses against larger drone salvos. The test is a development milestone, not proof of field performance, and should be assessed as one element in a layered airspace-security architecture.

    Sources