We’re Tracking the Future of Security

Category: Telecom

  • Sri Lanka Plans In-House Digital ID Pilot While Full Procurement Remains Delayed

    Sri Lanka Plans In-House Digital ID Pilot While Full Procurement Remains Delayed

    Sri Lanka is preparing a limited in-house pilot of its digital identity program while procurement for the full national system remains unresolved. Reporting on the government plan says bids for the master systems integrator role exceeded the Indian grant allocated to support the broader deployment.

    The pilot separates early testing from full procurement

    The planned Sri Lanka Unique Digital Identity system is based on the open-source MOSIP architecture. Officials are pursuing a phased approach so that identity issuance and operational testing can begin while financing and procurement discussions continue. Earlier public statements placed initial issuance before the end of 2026.

    The larger program involves biometric enrollment, identity lifecycle management and integration with government services. A limited pilot can test registration workflows and service interoperability, but it does not by itself resolve national-scale capacity, privacy governance, procurement or long-term support requirements.

    Identity infrastructure needs transparent acceptance criteria

    Before expansion, program owners should publish measurable controls for biometric quality, duplicate detection, consent, audit logging, credential recovery and data access. Independent security testing and clear retention rules are important when a pilot becomes a production identity platform. SectechMedia follows related systems in its access control and identity coverage.

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  • UK CertifID Trust Mark Goes Live With Five Digital Verification Providers

    UK CertifID Trust Mark Goes Live With Five Digital Verification Providers

    The United Kingdom has put its UK CertifID trust mark into operational use, with five digital verification service providers becoming the first organizations authorized to display it for registered services. The mark is intended to help users identify providers assessed against the national digital verification services trust framework.

    The mark is tied to registered services

    A government digital identity update names Orchestrating Identity, TrustID, CDD Services, Mistho and GBG as the first providers. Eligibility is linked to certification against version 1.0 of the trust framework and registration under the country’s digital identity governance system; it is not a general endorsement for every product offered by a company.

    Government usage guidance sets conditions for how the mark may appear and is designed to prevent presentation that could mislead customers about the scope of certification. The launch follows the broader move toward reusable digital verification services in regulated and public-facing transactions.

    Relying parties still need technical due diligence

    A visible trust mark can support procurement and user confidence, but organizations must still assess authentication strength, privacy controls, recovery processes, fraud monitoring and interoperability for each deployment. Contracts should identify exactly which registered service is being used. SectechMedia follows related developments in its access control and identity coverage.

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  • Mercury Survey Finds Wider Cybersecurity Gaps in Physical Access Controllers

    Mercury Survey Finds Wider Cybersecurity Gaps in Physical Access Controllers

    A new Mercury Security survey indicates that cybersecurity requirements are outpacing parts of the installed physical access control controller base. The company’s 2026 Trends in Access Controllers Report surveyed 561 physical security and cybersecurity professionals, including administrators, integrators, installers and end users.

    Reported cybersecurity gaps increased year over year

    Thirty-two percent of respondents said cybersecurity features were missing from their current controller systems, compared with 21% in the 2025 survey. Mercury also reported that 74% found coordination between cybersecurity and IT more difficult to manage, even as 86% said their organizations work to keep pace with changing security and data-protection requirements.

    Interoperability remained central to purchasing decisions. Sixty-nine percent described it as critical, while 82% considered backward and forward compatibility important to future planning. Interest in cloud connectivity also exceeded deployment: 56% cited it as a purchase consideration, but 41% reported cloud-enabled controllers.

    Modernization needs verifiable controls

    Survey results describe respondent perceptions rather than an independent audit of installed systems. Even so, they reinforce the need to verify secure boot, encrypted communications, credential protection, patch support, logging and network segmentation during controller selection. SectechMedia follows related architecture in its access control and identity coverage.

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  • Signal Expands End-to-End Encrypted Backups Across Mobile and Desktop Platforms

    Signal Expands End-to-End Encrypted Backups Across Mobile and Desktop Platforms

    Signal has expanded its encrypted backup system across Android, iOS, Linux, macOS and Windows. The update adds on-device backups to iOS and desktop clients, aligns local backups around a cross-platform format and improves restoration when users move between operating systems.

    Users can choose hosted or self-managed storage

    On-device backups preserve an end-to-end encrypted copy at a destination selected by the user, such as local storage or a network-attached device. Signal now stores media separately from the main archive and avoids duplicate local copies, reducing the storage needed for recurring snapshots.

    The hosted service remains optional. Signal says its paid tier can hold up to 100 gigabytes of media, while the free plan retains text and a limited period of media. A supplemental key stored in a trusted execution environment rotates daily, but restoration still requires the user’s recovery key.

    Recovery keys become a high-value security asset

    Organizations and individual users should protect backup recovery keys separately from devices and cloud accounts. Backup policies must also consider disappearing messages, endpoint compromise and recovery testing. SectechMedia tracks related identity and communications controls in its cybersecurity coverage.

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  • Microsoft Details NeedyMantis Malware Used for Long-Term Network Access

    Microsoft Details NeedyMantis Malware Used for Long-Term Network Access

    Microsoft Threat Intelligence has documented a post-compromise malware family named NeedyMantis that attackers have used to preserve long-term access inside selected organizations. The activity has affected a small number of telecommunications providers, universities, medical nonprofits, intergovernmental bodies and government contractors.

    The malware supports modular follow-on activity

    Microsoft says NeedyMantis has been observed since at least 2023 and is deployed after an attacker already gains entry. Its components can collect system information, execute commands and maintain communications that support later objectives. That role makes the malware a persistence and operational-access tool rather than the initial intrusion vector.

    The reported targeting spans sectors with valuable communications, research and policy data. Defenders therefore need to investigate how the first compromise occurred while also searching for the malware’s artifacts, related credentials and lateral movement across the environment.

    Removal requires more than deleting a payload

    Incident responders should scope affected identities, scheduled tasks, services and remote-management paths, then rotate credentials from a known-clean system. Historical endpoint and network telemetry can help establish dwell time and identify systems that no longer show an active implant. SectechMedia follows related defense measures in its cybersecurity coverage.

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  • Researchers Detail Fortinet-Based Intrusion at Thai Broadband Provider

    Researchers Detail Fortinet-Based Intrusion at Thai Broadband Provider

    Threat-intelligence researchers at Hunt.io have documented an intrusion affecting a Thai broadband provider in which attackers targeted a FortiGate SSL VPN and later deployed the MeshCentral remote-management platform. SecurityWeek independently summarized the research on September 15.

    The observed infrastructure hosted reconnaissance scripts, vulnerability probes, brute-force utilities and privilege-escalation tools. Hunt.io’s account links the activity to exploitation of a Fortinet flaw, but attribution to a named threat group was not established in the public reporting.

    Remote-management software can have legitimate administrative uses, which makes context essential. In this case, its placement alongside offensive tooling and the intrusion path made it part of the incident evidence rather than proof that the software itself was malicious.

    Why it matters

    Broadband providers sit at the intersection of public communications and critical infrastructure. Internet-facing security appliances require rapid patching, while remote-administration activity needs monitoring that can distinguish expected maintenance from unauthorized persistence.

    For wider context, see SectechMedia’s related technical coverage.

    Sources

  • Telecommunications Infrastructure Security Technology

    Telecommunications Infrastructure Security Technology

    Telecommunications infrastructure — cell towers, central offices, data exchange facilities and the fiber networks connecting them — forms a foundational layer of critical infrastructure that other sectors depend on for their own operations, from emergency services dispatch to financial transactions to the remote monitoring systems used across utilities and industrial facilities. Securing this infrastructure combines dispersed-site physical protection with facility-level access control and a growing emphasis on supply-chain and hardware integrity.

    Securing Widely Distributed, Often Unmanned Sites

    Cell towers and remote equipment shelters are typically unmanned and geographically dispersed, making them attractive targets for copper and equipment theft as well as vandalism. Operators increasingly deploy solar-powered remote monitoring systems combining motion-activated cameras, door and cabinet intrusion sensors, and cellular or satellite backhaul for alerting, since many tower sites lack reliable wired connectivity of their own for security reporting.

    Central Office and Data Exchange Access Control

    Central offices and carrier-neutral data exchange facilities, where multiple network operators interconnect, apply layered access control similar to data center security: biometric or multi-factor authentication at building and cage-level entry points, mantrap vestibules to prevent tailgating, and comprehensive video surveillance covering both public and restricted areas. Because these facilities often host equipment belonging to multiple competing carriers within the same building, access segmentation between tenant spaces is a particular design priority.

    Fiber Route and Cable Landing Protection

    Long-haul fiber routes and cable landing stations, where undersea cables come ashore, represent concentrated points of failure for national and international connectivity. Security for these assets combines physical protection of landing station buildings with monitoring of the buried or undersea cable routes themselves, an area where distributed acoustic sensing technology has found growing application for detecting unauthorized digging, dragging anchors or other activity near cable paths before physical damage occurs.

    Network Operations Center Security

    Network operations centers, which provide real-time monitoring and control over telecommunications infrastructure, require the same access control and video surveillance rigor as other critical control-room environments, given that a compromise of NOC systems could allow an attacker to disrupt network operations directly rather than through physical damage to remote infrastructure.

    Supply Chain and Equipment Integrity

    Telecommunications security increasingly extends into supply-chain risk management, with regulatory scrutiny in multiple countries focused on the origin and integrity of network equipment given concerns that compromised hardware or firmware could introduce backdoors into national communications infrastructure, adding a procurement and vendor-vetting dimension to what has traditionally been a purely physical and operational security discipline.

  • DAS and DTS for Telecom Manhole and Network Condition Monitoring

    DAS and DTS for Telecom Manhole and Network Condition Monitoring

    Telecom infrastructure contains thousands of manholes, ducts and underground routes that are difficult to inspect continuously. Distributed Acoustic Sensing and Distributed Temperature Sensing can add a new layer of visibility by using optical fiber itself as a distributed monitoring medium.

    What DAS Can Detect

    DAS measures vibration and dynamic strain along fiber. In a telecom network, this can help identify excavation activity, repeated impacts, vehicle-related vibration, unauthorized access around manholes and other mechanical disturbances. Because the event can be located along the fiber route, operators can focus inspection on the relevant section.

    What DTS Adds

    DTS provides a temperature profile rather than vibration information. Abnormal heating, environmental changes or local thermal anomalies may indicate conditions that deserve investigation. When DAS and DTS are combined, operators gain two independent physical measurements from the same corridor.

    Mapping Is Essential

    The sensing system reports distance along fiber, so accurate route mapping is critical. Splice points, loops, manholes and changes in cable routing must be documented so optical distance can be translated into a real physical location.

    Operational Value

    The goal is not to replace network-management systems. Optical performance monitoring tells operators about communications quality; distributed sensing provides information about the physical environment around the cable. Combining these views can improve maintenance prioritization and infrastructure security.

    Conclusion

    DAS and DTS can turn telecom fiber routes into sources of physical-condition data. For large underground networks, this creates the possibility of moving from periodic inspection toward continuous infrastructure awareness.

  • DAS and Passive Optical Networks: Broadband Fiber as Security Infrastructure

    DAS and Passive Optical Networks: Broadband Fiber as Security Infrastructure

    Passive Optical Networks are designed to deliver broadband efficiently to large numbers of users. Distributed Acoustic Sensing introduces another possibility: parts of the same fiber infrastructure may also provide information about vibration and activity along the route.

    Why PON Is Interesting for Sensing

    PON networks already extend deep into cities, campuses and residential areas. If sensing can coexist with communications traffic, broadband infrastructure could potentially support applications such as construction monitoring, intrusion awareness, transport analytics or infrastructure condition monitoring without installing a separate sensor cable everywhere.

    The technical challenge is that PON is not a simple point-to-point fiber. Optical splitters divide signals across branches, and the network is optimized for communications rather than sensing. Interpreting backscatter in this environment requires careful optical design, signal processing and route knowledge.

    Security and Infrastructure Applications

    Potential uses include monitoring access to telecom infrastructure, detecting excavation activity near buried routes, identifying unusual vibration around manholes and supporting broader urban sensing. In controlled industrial or campus environments, PON-based sensing could become one input to a physical-security platform.

    The key word is coexistence. Sensing should not compromise communications performance, service availability or network maintenance. Wavelength planning, optical budgets, splitter architecture and interrogator design all influence feasibility.

    Operational Questions

    Who owns the sensing data? How is privacy handled? How are alarms mapped from optical distance to geographic location? What happens when fiber routes are changed during maintenance? These questions are as important as raw detection performance.

    Conclusion

    PON sensing is an emerging area rather than a universal replacement for dedicated DAS installations. But the strategic idea is important: communications fiber may become dual-purpose infrastructure. If sensing can be added safely and economically, broadband networks could evolve from passive transport systems into distributed sources of infrastructure intelligence.

  • Using Telecom Fiber as a Distributed Sensor Network

    Using Telecom Fiber as a Distributed Sensor Network

    Telecom networks contain enormous lengths of optical fiber. Distributed fiber-optic sensing raises an important possibility: can some of that existing infrastructure become a sensing network as well as a communications network?

    The basic idea is compelling. An interrogator analyzes optical backscatter from fiber and converts tiny changes caused by vibration, strain or temperature into spatially resolved measurements. Depending on the sensing method, a single fiber can provide thousands of virtual measurement points.

    Potential Applications

    Existing telecom routes may support monitoring of roads, railways, urban activity, construction, earthquakes, utility corridors and infrastructure conditions. In some cases, spare or dark fiber can be connected directly to a sensing interrogator. More advanced architectures explore sensing over fibers that are also supporting communications traffic.

    The attraction is scale. Instead of installing a completely new sensor network, operators may be able to use fiber that is already buried across cities and transport corridors.

    But Existing Fiber Was Not Installed as a Sensor

    This is the key limitation. Telecom fiber may run through ducts, loose tubes, aerial routes, manholes and different soil conditions. Mechanical coupling varies along the route, meaning the same event can produce very different signals at different locations.

    Route documentation is also essential. A sensing system reports distance along fiber, not automatically a street address. Accurate mapping between optical distance and physical geography is therefore necessary before alarms become operationally useful.

    Shared Communications and Sensing

    Research and commercial development increasingly focus on coexistence between data transmission and sensing. This could make fiber networks part of a wider infrastructure-intelligence layer, but network design, optical power budgets, wavelength allocation and operational ownership must all be considered.

    Conclusion

    Telecom fiber has the potential to become one of the world’s largest distributed sensing platforms. The opportunity is significant, but successful projects require more than connecting an interrogator to a cable. Fiber routing, coupling, network architecture, data interpretation and operational integration determine whether existing telecom infrastructure can deliver reliable sensing intelligence.